January 2006 Archives

Photo illustration for St. Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologica > First Part of the Second Part > Question 31 > Article 6
Objection 1. It would seem that the pleasures of touch are not greater than the pleasures afforded by the other senses. Because the greatest pleasure seems to be that without which all joy is at an end. But such is the pleasure afforded by the sight, according to the words of Tobias 5:12: "What manner of joy shall be to me, who sit in darkness, and see not the light of heaven?" Therefore the pleasure afforded by the sight is the greatest of sensible pleasures.

Objection 2. Further, "every one finds treasure in what he loves," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But "of all the senses the sight is loved most" [Metaph. i, 1. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to be afforded by sight.

Objection 3. Further, the beginning of friendship which is for the sake of the pleasant is principally sight. But pleasure is the cause of such friendship. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to be afforded by sight.

A photographic illustration for the Summa Theologica > Second Part of the Second Part > Question 25 > Article 4

Objection 1. It would seem that a man is not bound to love himself out of charity. For Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xvii) that there "can be no charity between less than two." Therefore no man has charity towards himself.

Objection 2. Further, friendship, by its very nature, implies mutual love and equality (Ethic. viii, 2,7), which cannot be of one man towards himself.

But charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above (23, 1). Therefore a man cannot have charity towards himself.